Abstract. We present a brief overview of the main challenges related to data protection that need to be addressed when data are stored, processed, or managed in the cloud. We also discuss emerging approaches and directions to address such challenges.
to the cloud. Since encryption makes query evaluation and application execution more expensive or not always possible (see next challenge on 'fine-grained access to outsourced data'), alternative fragmentation-based solutions have been also proposed (e.g., [1, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10] ). Fragmentation allows departing from encryption whenever what is sensitive are not the data values singularly taken but their association (e.g., in a medical database, patients' names and illnesses might be considered public, while the specific association between the name of each patient and her illness might be considered sensitive). In this case, instead of encrypting the values, the sensitive association can be protected by storing values that are sensitive in association in di↵erent fragments so to break the association itself impeding its visibility to non authorized parties. For instance, with reference to our example, the patients' names can be stored in one fragment and illnesses in another one. To ensure that the sensitive associations protected by fragments cannot be reconstructed, fragments can be stored at independent (and non communicating) providers, or fragments must be guaranteed to be unlinkable. Fragmentation limits encryption to values that are sensitive by themselves, or even completely departs from encryption in cases (e.g., hybrid cloud) where the availability of a trusted party can be assumed for some storage/computation support. The advantage of using fragmentation is the availability of data in the clear, which enables evaluation of conditions on them and therefore better support for query processing by the cloud provider. In addition to data confidentiality, data integrity (i.e., authenticity and integrity of the stored data) and availability (i.e., the satisfaction by cloud providers of the data storage and access requirements that users may wish to enforce) are two further aspects that need to be addressed [3, 29] .
Fine-grained access to outsourced data. As noted above, cloud providers cannot have full access to the data they store, which might be either encrypted or fragmented. Also, when data are encrypted, the encryption key should remain within the client's trust boundary to ensure data remain confidential even with respect to the storing and processing provider itself. Providers cannot then decrypt data for query execution, making evaluation of conditions and query support di cult (if at all possible). The problem of providing support for finegrained access (i.e., retrieval of data satisfying given conditions) over encrypted data has been under the attention of the research and development community in recent years and several investigations have been carried out. Among the analyzed techniques there are: cryptographic techniques supporting keyword-based searches (e.g., [4] ), homomorphic encryption (e.g., [22] ), the use of di↵erent layers of encryption each supporting specific operations [33] , and metadata (indexes) attached to the data and used for fine-grained information retrieval and execution of specific kinds of queries (e.g., [5, 25, 39] ). The major di culty in such investigations is the tradeo↵ existing between providing support for query processing and ensuring that such support does not leak sensitive information otherwise protected by encryption (or fragmentation).
Selective data access. Data stored in the cloud may be subject to di↵erent access control policies, meaning that di↵erent users might need to enjoy di↵erent views on the outsourced data. Enforcing authorizations providing such selective access in cloud environments results particularly challenging since, if on one side clearly the data owner cannot provide such enforcement itself (as it would mean intercepting every access to data), on the other side, the cloud provider may not be fully trusted for such an enforcement. Also, the policy itself might be sensitive or leak information on the data content. There are two main lines of work investigating solutions for enforcing access control policies in the cloud. The first line of work, under the generic umbrella of attribute-based encryption (ABE) [24, 41] is based on public key encryption and enforces authorizations by ensuring that encryption depends on the values of certain attributes (which characterize authorized users). This way, a user will be able to access data if her set of attributes matches conditions on the attributes associated with the encrypted data. ABE allows enforcement of authorizations that depend on di↵erent conditions, thus providing expressive authorization support. The main limitation of such approaches relate to the evaluation cost (given the use of public key encryption) and to the di culty of enforcing revocation. The second line of work, called selective encryption [12, 13] , is based instead on the use of symmetric encryption and enforces authorizations by translating the authorization policy into an equivalent encryption policy so that data can be encrypted with di↵erent keys and keys are distributed to users in such a way that they can decrypt all (completeness) and only (correctness) the data they are authorized to access. A hierarchical organization of the encryption keys employed enables enforcing such authorizations (providing di↵erent views over data) while ensuring both a single copy of the data and the use of only one key per user. In fact, proper organization of keys in a hierarchy, with tokens enabling key derivation allows users to derive, from their own key all and only the keys enabling access to data they are authorized to access. Selective encryption provides e cient access control, as only symmetric encryption is used. Also, the use of public tokens enabling key derivation allows their storage in the cloud itself. Changes to the access policies (i.e., grant or revocation of authorizations) can be conveniently enforced by over-encryption, by which the data owner can enforce changes to authorizations with the cooperation of the cloud provider, that -when demanded -can wrap the data with a further level of encryption at the provider side (encrypting resources already encrypted by the owner). Over-encryption enforces authorization changes without the need for the data owner of retrieving, re-encrypting, and re-uploading data already stored in the cloud.
Query privacy. In addition to data themselves, several scenarios may also require confidentiality guarantees on accesses made on data. A classical example of these scenarios is a medical encyclopedia: while the encyclopedia itself is not sensitive and neither might be (with respect to the storing provider) the identity of users accessing it, the specific entries that a user looks for might be considered confidential as they may disclose her (or of a person close to her) health condition. Similar query confidentiality guarantees might also be requested when stored data are encrypted (as knowledge of the access might even compromise the confidentiality of the stored data). The problem then arises of guaranteeing access confidentiality, that is, the fact that a given access aims at given data, as well as pattern confidentiality, that is, the fact that two accesses aim at the same data. We call these new confidentiality guarantees query privacy as the aim is to have them while also supporting e cient access to data for query support (e.g., index-search and evaluation of range conditions). Classical solutions providing access privacy, such as private information retrieval proposals, o↵er strong guarantees but limited access functionality and bear performance overhead that make them not applicable in real-life scenarios. Among more recent approaches, Path ORAM and the shu✏e index, provide better performance and therefore applicability. Both these solutions are based on specific index structures and provide protection by either relying on a local stash, with dynamic re-mapping and delayed writing (Path ORAM) [37] or by relying on caching, cover searches, and shu✏ing with dynamic re-allocation of data at every access (shu✏e index) [16, 17] . Open issues are related to the need of decreasing the performance overhead, providing more support for queries, and ensuring strong confidentiality guarantees.
Integrity of query results. In addition to confidentiality, integrity of data can also be put at risk when the involved provider(s) may not be fully trustworthy. While for storage integrity classical techniques (e.g., chaining and signature) can be used, ensuring integrity of data dynamically retrieved, or resulting from computation, is challenging. Assessing integrity for query results or computations entails providing users with the ability to verify that the result returned by the cloud provider is complete (i.e., computed on the whole data collection), correct (i.e., computed on genuine data and correctly performing the computation), and fresh (i.e., computed on the most recent version of the data). Approaches for guaranteeing integrity of query results can be classified as deterministic (e.g., [30, 31, 32] ) and probabilistic (e.g., [15, 23, 36, 38, 40, 42] ). Deterministic solutions use authenticated data structures (e.g., signature chains, Merkle hash trees, skip lists) or encryption-based solutions and can detect an integrity violation only for queries formulated on the attribute(s) on which they have been defined. Probabilistic solutions are based on the insertion of fictitious information or checks in a dataset whose absence in a query result signals an integrity violation. Probabilistic approaches can detect an integrity violation for any query but only with probabilistic guarantees, meaning that they are subject to false negative results. The problem of assessing integrity of query results becomes even more complex in emerging scenarios for distributed computation, where di↵erent providers or workers may be involved (e.g., [11] ).
Collaborative computation with selective sharing. In several scenario computation or query execution in the cloud might involve data under the control of di↵erent authorities (data owners) and stored at di↵erent providers, which may impose di↵erent access and sharing restrictions on their data. Some approaches have addressed the problem of performing collaborative computations in contexts where no sharing is possible between the involved parties and only the query result can be known to them (e.g., secure multi-party computation or sovereign joins [2] ). These solutions are based on the use of encryption together with the possible involvement of a trusted computing base. Other approaches have considered scenarios where data can be selectively shared with other parties and di↵erent data owners and/or cloud providers need to collaborate, and selectively share information with others, for query execution. The problem addressed is then the distributed query execution (which necessarily entails exchange of data among the involved parties) in such a way that data are made visible only to authorized parties and no information is improperly shared or leaked [14, 43] . In this context, ongoing work is investigating novel techniques for expressing and enforcing sharing policies, regulating information flows in query execution, and e ciently computing a query execution plan ensuring that no information is improperly released or leaked. Other approaches address the orthogonal problem of protecting the objectives of queries from the providers involved in their evaluation (e.g., [20] ).
